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This report is focused upon regulatory institutions that organize prices within a network of 
commodity flows. The network has economic properties of the natural gas pipeline industry and 
the regulatory institutions have properties similar to those that arc being considered as alternatives 
for the current rate hearing process. The questions posed at this stage of research are somewhat 
basic about the technical details of the institutions and how markets perfonn when they are in place. 
In order to isolate the independent effects of the institutions and separate them from many 
complicating economic activities that can occur in networks, it is best to begin with a study of 
relatively simple systems. It is also necessary to abstract from many important issues. For 
example, the legal details of the regulatory institutions are not addressed. Various uncertainties and 
complications resulting from uncertainty about commodity demand are not addressed directly. 
Such issues can be addressed by application of the same methodology, but at this stage of the 
investigation, they are not. The research strategy and overview of the study is contained in the first 
section. 
Research Strategy and Overview 
Four basic types of questions arc posed by the research. The first type of question relates to 
the technical details of the regulatory institutions. Exactly how will the critical economic decisions 
be made? Who makes pricing decisions? Exactly what rules will be used? Who will be infonned 
about what and when? What will be the timing of decisions relative to information? What 
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commitment follows decisions? All of these questions arc interdependent in the sense that the 
dimension of Ol}r question about technical details, the number of forms the question can take, 
depends upon the answers to other questions. 
The second and third types of questions are related to market perfonnance in the presence 
of the regulatory institutions. Are there economic forces which operate to circumvent the intended 
effects of market regulatory institutions in complicated networks? That the markets will work to 
move commodity at all is not obvious. Commodity flow through a pipeline network involves 
special coordination. The nature of the coordination changes as prices change along alternative 
routes. The interdependence inherent in networks would seem to be very important since high 
prices along one route could shift commodity flow to alternative routes. If prices along alternative 
routes are very sensitive to changes in demand and supply conditions, the ability of certain 
regulatory institutions to deal with the complexity can be challenged in terms of basic principles of 
market dynamics. Certainly thoughts of instability raise questions. 
The fourth type of question addresses the sensitivity of any conclusions about market 
performance to the underlying parameters. Docs competition make a substantial difference in 
market behavior? Is the structure of owncrshi p or control important? What difference is caused by 
alternative costs and demands? Do slight changes in the regulations make critical differences? 
Three basic types of regulatory institutions are investigated. The first type is a policy of 
administered prices that is adjusted by trial and error until a "satisfactory" price is found. During 
the trial and error phase, participants submit binding offers in response to the announced price, but 
all transactions take place only at the final satisfactory price. Such market institutions fall under a 
general terminology called "tatonnemcnt processes" as named by the inventor in the 1860s. 1 
The second type is a decentralized pricing policy (technically called the multiple unit 
double auction). 2 In this process, buyers and sellers of commodity and of transportation services 
1) Leon Walras, ElemenJs of Pure Ecmwmics 
2) Plott and Gray, Social Science Working Paper no. 625. Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, March 1987. 
are free to quote their own prices and adjust prices as they think best reflect their own 
circumstances and profit opportunities. The third type of regulatory institution is a process that has 
tested usefully in experiments that have interdependencies similar to those of pipeline networks.3 
The technical name is "Automated User Selection Mechanism" (AUSM). Because of its success in 
the related problems, it was a natural to try in the network. 
Many combinations exist among the regulatory institutions, economic variables, and types 
of questions that might be asked. In almost all cases, neither previous experience nor previous 
experimentations can be used to provide answers. In a sense, all variables are relevant, but because 
there are so many combinations, a complete, balanced design which permits an empirical 
examination of all important cases is impractical for any reasonable time frame. A different 
approach was necessary. 
A decision was made to follow a sequential research design to determine which types of 
regulatory institutions might make sense for policy discussions about the US industry. In this 
approach, a single experiment or sometimes a few experiments are used to determine the 
importance of certain variables. Favorable results would lead to more complicated experiments 
along the most promising directions. This research process leads to a rather complicated decision 
tree with decisions at some nodes based upon considerable judgment about what might be the 
ultimate results along some research branch if it were pursued. Such judgments are based on both 
theory and experience. 
Section 1 reviews the first stage of research involving a study of a single market with no 
transportation. In the cases of some forms of market organization (MUDA and AUSM), that stage 
of research had been completed in other studies. There was no need for further research in a single 
market on those two types of institutions. The administrative trial and error process (tatonnement) 
is different Only one short study exists (Joyce 1984) and that study addressed none of the 
3) Banks, Ledyard and Porter, Social Science Working Paper no. 648. Pasadena.: California Institute of Technology, June 
1987. 
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important details for the pipeline policy problem. The single market was a logical place to study 
t§tonnement. Single markets are less expensive and they are also less complicated so the nature of 
any difficulties can be identified and corrected by slight changes in policies or procedure. The 
single markets are a good place to find "bugs" in policies because in complicated multiple market 
networked systems the reasons for bad performance might not be easily identifiable. 
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Experiments and computer simulations were used to explore the technical details of 
t§tonnement processes. Many different price adjustment rules exist of which two were studied in 
detail. In addition, different rules for stopping the adjustment process and fixing a price to be used 
by the industry can be imagined and each of these must be appended with additional rules to 
prevent the process from stopping accidentally or getting locked into a divergent pattern of price 
changes. The appropriate information feedback to participants must be determined. For example, 
should total expressed demands and supplies be publicly announced, or should statistics based on 
the totals be announced, or should nothing be made public about the decisions of others? All of 
these very technical details can potentially interact with the decision behavior of participants, which 
in turn can affect the performance of the process. Theory does not give clear answers to such 
detailed questions so actual experiments must be conducted. 
The sequential research design required that we study and modify policies in the context of 
a single market experiment until versions of the policies were obtained that were worth testing in 
multiple markets. The multiple market research would begin first with a small network with eight 
markets. This small network was actually pan of a larger network (with nineteen markets) that was 
to be used to study regulatory institutions that lead to satisfactory market performances in the small 
network. Some marginal changes in demand and supply conditions were implemented across 
experiments, but the basic conditions of demand and cost were held constant 
Decisions were made to study a network which has some features that departed from the 
facts of the industry. This was done to present the regulatory institutions and the theories about 
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their performance with a more extreme test than might exist in the field. For this reason, a decision 
was made to separate the ownership of transportation facilities from the ownership of commodity 
production. This separation presents a more difficult coordination problem than might exist if 
ownerships are combined. A single owner can transport commodity to markets without need to 
coordinate with others. Even though the combined ownership could be imagined to create 
monopoly problems, the issue of concentration and possible inefficiencies that stem from it is 
separable from the problems that can be caused by multiple and decentralized decision makers. 
Similar logic resulted in a decision to conduct experiments in which no price controls 
existed. This differs substantially from the U.S. industry. Again, the reason for such a departure 
from the facts of the industry was to provide an adequate challenge to the process. Price ceilings 
and floors could obviously induce efficient behavior if set correctly (e.g., if set at the competitive 
equilibrium), but the successful operation of market regulatory institutions should not depend 
critically upon the existence of correct limitations on prices. 
Experiments with the small network resulted in a decision to drop the tiitonnement 
processes from further study. Three experiments were conducted. None ever terminated in a 
pattern of prices that pennitted trade. The exact reasons for the failure of this type of regulation are 
unclear, but conjectures advanced in the body of the report are based upon strategic behavior that 
can exist within the policy. 
Similarly, experiments with the small network led to a decision to drop AUSM from further 
consideration. The network configuration and the nature of the technical generalizations of AUSM 
required to accommodate the facts of the network opened the way for potential profits from 
strategic behavior. If this particular type of strategic behavior was followed by enough people, it 
would lead to no trade at all. In fact, the strategic behavior was far beyond that sufficient to make 
the system break down. Without any obvious "quick fixes" close at hand, a decision was made not 
to continue the line of research. 
Experiments with MUDA in the small network yielded sufficiently satisfactory results to 
justify a challenge to that type of regulatory environment with a tougher test within the larger 
network. The several experiments in the smaU network and several series of experiments in the 
larger network provided lessons about the organization of so many markets and in the nature of 
computerized multiple market systems. All of these lessons are captured in the final series of 
experiments. Consequently, only one series, the final series, is reported in the body of the text 
because it summarizes the lessons from all of the others. In this series, competition was created 
along all segments of the pipeline. Every two points were connected by two competitive pipelines, 
neither of which had the capacity to serve the whole demand at competitive prices. Under such 
competitive circumstances, the prices approximated the competitive equilibrium prices, and market 
efficiencies ranged in the 70 and 80 percent level. While these efficiencies are not high relative to 
what is observed in single markets, they are much better than the other types of market regulations 
which did not work satisfactorily at all. Efficiencies increased as participants gained experience 
with the process and got as high as 90 percent. 
After a larger group of participants had experience with the network, participants were 
chosen at random to participate in the same pipeline system with monopolized segments. All 
conditions were identical, except along every segment, capacities were merged into a single 
transportation supplier. The number of suppliers was reduced from six suppliers over ten segments 
to three suppliers, which collectively supplied the ten segments. Each segment had only one 
supplier. The result was a decrease in efficiency and a shift in the relative distribution of income 
away from commodity producers and consumers to the pipeline companies. However, the drop in 
efficiency was such that the absolute level of profits of transporters was not increased over what 
prevailed under competition. 
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SECTION 1: SINGLE MARKETS: 
Administered Trial and Error Pricing (Tatonnement) in a Single Market 
Experimental work has shown that under favorable conditions an administered trial and 
error process (tatonnement) will converge to an equilibrium price (Joyce 1984). However, it is not 
known that such prices will converge under the particular type of economic circumstances that are 
thought to exist in the natural gas pipeline industry. This section examines two types of 
tatonnement processes and reports on their behavior in a single market. The market has some of the 
relevant and difficult characteristics of the industry. 
In all experiments, demands and supplies were induced through financial incentives. The 
technique has been widely used (See Smith 1982, Plott 1982). The special features of the industry 
that might cause problems are the constant cost of transportation and the inelastic demand. 
Together, these features almost guarantee the lack of existence of an equilibrium price in the 
classical sense; that is, a price at which the quantity desired as demand exactly equals the quantity 
desired as supply. Figure 1, which reflects the parameters actually used in some.of the experiments, 
demonstrates the problem. At the price P0 = 195, the desired demand is D0 = 16, but the desired 
supply is S0 = 35.4 If prices are slightly above P 0 , supply exceeds demand and, if prices are 
slightly below P 0 , demand exceeds supply. At no price does quantity demanded equal the quantity 
supplied. If an administrator sees only the expressed demand and the expressed supply, then he 
could never find a price that equated the two. If the rule given to the administrator for adjusting 
prices did not have special features to deal with the problem or, if individual decisions in the 
process of adjusunents did not adjust to help solve the problem, then the administrative process 
could cycle forever with no satisfactory tennination. 
4) In a Debreu (1959) sense, an equilibrium exists because suppliers are indifferent among all quantities from 0 to S0 • 
Thus, the quantity D0 can be viewed as the supply as well as the demand. At P0 , both demand and supply are D0 , so 
quantity supplied equals quantity demanded. However, if the flat supply is caused by a price floor, the Debreu argument 
does not hold. Nevertheless the Debreu concept of equilibrium seems to apply as a model of behavior. 
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Parameters Used in Ex~riment 4 
FIGURE 1 
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The two tatonnement processes studied in this section differ by the mechanical features 
used to determine price changes. They also differ by the rule for stopping price changes and deal 
with the problem above. 
Two price change rules are explored. Let 
ED1 = Expressed quantity demanded at period t, minus express quantity supplied at period t. 
(1) (The Secant Rule) 
(2) (The Proportional Adjustment Rule) 
P1 = P1_ 1 +a ED1_ 1 a> 0 
While both the Secant Rule (1) and the Proportional Adjustment Rule (2) specify methods 
for price changes, neither rule specifies a method of actual price determination; the price at which 
trades are made. The following performs that important function. The system stops if 
Equation (3) can be satisfied in two ways. Either (3.1) ED1_ 1 = 0 or (3.2) the ratio 
E;t-I = ~;2 gets so small relative to ED,_1 that the precision of the calculation (usually lo-4) is 
1-1 1-2 
insufficient to record a change. When either event occurs, the process stops and the price is set. 
Both processes were simulated under a variety of demand and supply conditions. These 
simulations are contained in Appendix A. Convergence always occurred even in the cases of 
nonexistence of the equilibrium P. The numerical methods implied by (1), (2), and (3) simply "fill 
in" holes. Of course, when the system stops at a "pseudo" equilibrium, such as P 0 in the figure, 
some sort of rationing would be necessary. The quantity demanded and supplied would not be in 
balance even though the price is "efficient" and no price would be "better." Special care must also 
be taken to ensure that the "efficient" price is chosen because slight errors in price could result in 
big errors in trades. For example, if the system stopped at a price slightly above P 0 , the volume 
would be 16, but if the price were slightly below P 0 , the volume would drop to 5. 
Process Procedures 
The process is described by the following set of rules. 
1. Agents were located such that no means of communication was possible. 
2. The process began with an initial price made public to all agents. 
3. Each agent transmitted a quantity that he/she wanted to buy or sell at that price. 
4. The sum of individual demands and the sum of individual supplies were made public. 
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5. A check was made to detennine if the system should tenninate. 
6. If the system tenninated, trades were made at the existing prices. If rationing was necessary, it 
was accomplished randomly. 
7. If the system did not tenninate, a new price was calculated using the appropriate rule. The 
new price was publicly announced. Such an iteration was called a trial. 
8. The rules for price changes and terminations were public knowledge. 
9. Records of all public infonnation were maintained publicly. 
Experimental Procedures 
A series of six experiments were conducted. Each consisted of a series of periods in which 
a price detennination was made and trades took place. The individual parameters remained the 
same from period to period in some experiments and in other experiments they changed each 
period. 
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Experimental Results 
All six of the separate experiments were conducted under the secant process. These 
operated under a variety of different conditions. The results of all experiments are in Appendix B. 
Figure 1 contains the demand and supply parameters for Experiment 4. The final price, the final 
expressed demand and supply quantities. the number of iterations until stopping, and the stopping 
rule used are in Table 1. This experiment is useful because it demonstrates much of the phenomena 
seen in the more extensive experiments. For example, the appendix contains experiments with? 
Markets conducted in sequence with parameter changes allow a check on the ability of the process 
to respond to changing conditions. 
Several properties of the data from Experiment 4 are of interest. First, every period 
resulted in a final price. Notice, however. that this final price is not the same price even though 
each period the underlying demand and supply parameters are the same. Final price changes, even 
though the economic conditions do not (e.g .. compare the Period 3 price of 365 to the Period 4 
price of 196). Notice also that the number of trials needed for convergence changes from period to 
period. These differences reflect attempts by agents to manipulate the process. 
Of particular interest are the stopping rules. In every period except Period 4, the system 
stopped because expressed demand equaled expressed supply even though such equilibrium does 
not exist theoretically. More importantly, a close look at the numbers reveals that volumes in some 
periods (2, 3, and 7) are above the maximum possible demand of sixteen. Agents are purchasing 
units for which they have no use. Such purchases are a pure loss incurred in order to get the 
process to stop iterating. 
Notice that the process can stop with demand and supply unequal (Periods 1 and 4). In 
these periods, available demand must be rationed among the suppliers. 
TABLE 1: Single Market Tatonnement #4 
1. Parameters-4 equal buyers and 7 equal sellers 
Demand Supply 
Price Quantity Price Quantity 
601 0 196 35 
600 16 195 35 
0 16 194 5 
0 5 
2. Equilibrium-none exists 
pseudo equilibrium P 0 = 195 
3. Final Results 
Stopping No.of 
Period Price D s Rule Trials 
1 325 18 20 rounding 19 
2 197 20 20 D =S 18 
3 365 17 17 D =S 4 
4 196 15 21 rounding 17 
5 196 15 15 D =S 19 
6 202 17 17 D =S 21 
Analysis 
1. Divergence from the "pseudo" equilibrium price in experiments (see Experiment 5 in 
Appendix B) demonstrated the need to add the absolute value as contained in the term in (1). 
This addition assumes that demand curves arc always downward sloping and that supply 
curves are always upward sloping. 
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The absolute value term helps eliminate a problem caused by random behavior, by strategic 
behavior, and by boundary behavior problems. Unlike analytic functions, human behavior is 
not the same whenever a given price is repeated more than once. People try to manipulate the 
system to obtain a better deal for themselves. Or, they may be attempting to get the process to 
converge so they can undertake the transaction and make money. Sometimes the process 
results in price quotations that are not taken seriously, so people do not bother to respond or 
respond with nonsensical amounts. For all of these reasons, responses do not occur with 
constant mathematical precision. 
2. Convergence occurs. All single market experiments converged after the absolute value term 
was added to the rule. 
3. Convergence was due to strategic behavior of participants and not because of the "filling in" 
property of the process. In order to see this, notice that all experiments terminate at a P 
because ED = 0 at that P, even though, theoretically, such a P does not exist. People adopted 
strategies that they believed would help the process converge. 
Profits are made only when the process stops at an equilibrium. Trades take place only 
when the process stops. Thus, people have an interest in stopping the process. 
4. Efficiency was not 100 percent. This results from buyer purchases of units for which they had 
zero redemption value. The theoretical possibility that the process stops with no trades never 
occurred. 
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5. Good information feedback to participants about expressed demands and supplies might be 
necessary for convergence. This conjecture is suggested by the fact that information seemed 
to be used by participants to get the process to stop. Sellers who held back from the 
competitive response and buyers who purchased more than the competitive response needed to 
make such responses strategically to match the offers of each other. Such strategies require 
information. Without the information, strategic play would probably be reduced but in that 
case the incidence of successful convergence would also be reduced. 
In the simulations presented in Appendix A, no such information was used. Buyers and 
sellers responded competitively. As a result, stopping was due to a gradual diminution of 
price changes until the rounding precision of (3.2) was exceeded and no price change occurred. 
This particular rule may not be reliable with people making decisions because human 
decisions reflecting mistakes, frustration, search or slight adjustments in strategies are always 
present. Such adjustments may be sufficient to prevent convergence. 
Algorithms that anticipate stochastic features of systems do exist. However, they depend 
upon some sort of averaging process which creates (theoretically) room for profitable 
manipulation. Because of this potential difficulty, such classes of process were not pursued. 
SECTION 2: THE SYSTEM NETWORK 
Two networks are studied. The largest network is shown in Figure 2. The nodes are site 
specific locations called points. Such points arc the locations of either producers (e.g., points Pl, 
P3, P6) or consumers (e.g., P2, P4, PS, P8, P9). The arcs connecting the points (called lines) 
represent the locations of pipelines. A given pipeline company might operate over several different 
lines (e.g., one company might own pipelines over lines LIO, Ll l, and L12). 
The smaller network which was used for initial tests of policies is shown in Figure 3. This 
network is simply a subset of the larger ne.twork. In particular, the smaller network was the left-
hand portion of the larger network consisting of points P6, P7, PS, and P9, together with connecting 
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lines Ll5, Ll 7, L 18, and L 19. 
The important economic parameters arc Lhe number, location, and capacity of consumers, 
gas producers, and pipelines. In addition, Lhe ownership of gas production wells and pipelines are 
variables. 
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Demands and costs were again induced by monetary incentives. The nature of these 
incentives was adapted to the network. Consumers are given redemption values for units consumed. 
They are able to keep as earnings the difference between the redemption values of units consumed 
and the amount spent acquiring and transporting the units. Gas producers are given cost schedules. 
Their profits are the difference between the cost of production plus any transportation expenditures 
and the income received from the sale of commodity. The costs considered are only variable costs, 
since capacity expansion is not allowed, capital cost and related expenses are not relevant for the 
problem. Similarly, pipeline owners arc given a variable cost of transporting commodity through 
their pipelines. Each pipeline is treated as a separate facility with flow over one segment having no 
influence on the cost of transporting commodity over a different segment The profits of 
transporters were the difference between the revenue received from transportation fees and the cost 
of transport. Depending upon the policy, participants might also profit from buying commodity in 
one market and either reselling it in the same market or transporting it to another market for sale. 
The demands and costs were chosen to have some of the properties of the industry. Some 
consumers had very inelastic demands at prices near the competitive equilibrium while others had 
elastic demands. Producers and pipelines had nat costs up to a capacity limit after which cost 
became steep. 
The actual parameters for the full network and the small network are in Tables 2 and 3. 
The redemption values are stated in units called francs. Thus, all transactions are quoted in terms 
of francs. The franc/dollar conversion rates arc also given in the tables. The convention of using 
francs permits the study of identical economic situations with the same participants without the 
TABLE 2: Parameters for Experiments on Large Network 
Cost/ Comp. Comp. Comp. 
Location Agent Type Redemption Price Value Profits 
Pl A Producer 130,5 157 8 150 
152,4 
B Producer 130,5 8 150 
152,4 
P2 c Consumer 207,4 177 4 120 
105,4 
P3 F Consumer 230,6 190 10 292 
203,4 
P4 D Producer 130,5 165 7 185 
160,4 
E Producer 130,5 7 185 
160,4 
PS G Consumer 230,4 206 6 104 
210,2 
P6 H Producer 140,5 200 9 420 
170,4 
I Producer 140,5 9 420 
170,4 
P7 Nothing 231 
P8 J Consumer 280,6 245 10 230 
250,4 
P9 K Consumer 300,4 252 9 264 
270,4 
L Consumer 295,4 9 250 
265,6 
LIO M Pipeline 10,8 20 8 80 
15,3 
Q Pipeline 10,3 8 80 
15,3 
TABLE 2; Parameters for Experiments on Large Network (cont.) 
Cost/ Comp. Comp. Comp. 
Location Agent Type Redemption Price Value Profits 
Lll M Pipeline 5,6 13 6 48 
8,3 
Q Pipeline 5,6 6 48 
8,3 
L12 M Pipeline 6,3 16 3 30 
11,12 
R Pipeline 6,3 3 30 
11,12 
L13 N Pipeline 14,7 25 7 77 
20,3 
Q Pipeline 14,7 7 77 
20,3 
L14 N Pipeline 29,4 41 4 48 
36,3 
R Pipeline 29,4 4 48 
36,3 
L15 N Pipeline 11,4 21 5 50 
16,3 
s Pipeline 11,4 5 50 
16,3 
L17 p Pipeline 19,7 32 10 106 
27,3 
R Pipeline 19,7 10 106 
27,3 
L18 p Pipeline 4,7 13 9 73 
8,3 
s Pipeline 4,7 9 73 
8,3 
L19 p Pipeline 5,4 10 4 20 
9,3 
s Pipeline 5,4 
9,3 
4 20 
TABLE 3: Parameters for Experiments on Small Network 
Comp. Comp. Comp. 
Location Agent Type Cost/Redemption Eq. Alloc. Profit 
P6 A Producer 110,6 
170,2 
B Produce~ 110,4 
170,6 
P7 c Producer 230,2 
240,4 
250,4 
P8 F Consumer 340,6 
310,4 
P9 G Consumer 430,4 
240,4 
H Consumer 360,4 
310,4 
L15 E Pipeline 20,12 
30,6 
L17 D Pipeline 30,16 
50,6 
L18 D Pipeline 20,10 
30,6 
L19 D Pipeline 30,12 
50,4 
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participants becoming aware of the similarities because the units are different. The tables are read 
as follows. Starting at the top of Table 2, the reference is Pl at the far right-hand point of Figure 2. 
Agent A is located there as is Agent B. Both arc producers and their variable costs are the same. 
The marginal cost of producing is 130 for the fl rst five units that A produces and it jumps to 142 for 
four more units. The total capacity of A is nine units. 
The Competitive Equilibrium Model 
A standard of measurement of performance of a policy is efficiency. If cost/benefit theory 
is applied, the social optimum occurs when agents as a group (consumers, producers, and pipelines) 
have earned the maximum possible profits given the economic constraints. The efficiency of the 
system operating under a policy is the ratio of actual profits of participants divided by the 
maximum possible profits. In other words, if the system is operating at 25 percent efficiency under 
a policy, the participants are as a group earning 25 percent of the maximum possible. 
A standard behavioral model of a process is the competitive equilibrium price vector and 
allocation vector. In the networks studied here, many different competitive equilibria exist For 
purposes of comparison, a "natural" one was chosen5 and is given in the table for each market and 
agent. To continue the first line of Table 2, as an example, the competitive equilibrium price for 
commodity delivered at A is 157. In equilibrium, A will produce and sell eight units for a profit of 
150. 
SECTION 3: TRIAL AND ERROR ADMINISTERED PRICES (TATONNEMENT) ON 
MULTIPLE MARKETS 
The administered process (tatonncment) was first implemented in the small network of 
Table 3. Both the secant process and the proportional rule explained earlier were applied. When 
problems were encountered, an attempt was made to implement a less flexible policy in which 
5) Both producers and pipeline owners receive a five franc profit per unit over the marginal cost and all other rents are 
caprured by consumers. Allocations of identical individuals arc the same. 
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transportation charges were derived as the difference between the prices at connecting points. 
Nothing worked. 
The processes were implemented by a networked computer. Agents entered decisions at 
their own computers and prices were announced on each display screen. The first attempt had the 
following major features: 
(1) A separate market existed for each economic variable. That means a separate price existed 
for commodity delivered at each location point. A separate price also existed for each line. 
(2) The process began with an initial price announced for each market. 
(3) All agents submitted the quantities of commodity they desired at each location and the 
quantities of transportation services they wanted to use along each line. 
(4) Commodity producers reported the quantity they were willing to supply at each location 
given the announced commodity prices and transportation charges. 
(5) Pipelines announced the capacity they were willing to supply along each line given the 
announced transportation prices. 
(6) Any agent could engage in arbitrage by purchasing commodity at one location, purchasing 
the necessary transportation, and selling the transported commodity in another location (or 
consuming it in the case of consumers). 
(7) The computer checked to see if demands and supplies balanced. If not, and if one of the 
other stopping rules was not applicable, new prices were calculated and displayed. 
(8) The price in each market was calculated independently by the Secant Rule (1). In later 
experiments, the Proportional Ruic (2) was used. 
(9) All markets remained open until all markets had simultaneously equilibrated. 
(10) Special techniques6 were used to keep isolated markets open when they had equilibrated 
6) A distinction was made between calculated prices and reported prices. Only integers were reported, but calculated prices 
were computed with precision to 10-8• When price changes were so small that greater degrees of precision were needed, or 
when excess demand was zero, the markets would close. When this happened, the market was kept open by a "kick-start" 
procedure of letting DP = 1. 
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before the other markets. 
( 11) Each agent had a record of all previous prices for all markets, the previous excess demands 
in all markets, and his own decisions in all markets. 
Network Tatonnement Experiments 
Several experiments were conducted before the details of a consistent policy could be 
formulated. The need to keep markets open became clear early. Markets might temporarily 
equilibrate, but then need to disequilibrate as the convergence process in the remaining markets 
foster changes in traffic flows. If the rules for single, isolated markets are applied, and as a result, 
the market equilibrates too early, then the price can become fixed at prices that generate excess 
supplies or excess demands when the other markets in the network finally reach an equilibrium. 
The problem can be severe. For example, a pipeline market that should be operating at the 
margin of capacity at high prices in competitive equilibrium might have very little demand while 
upstream pipelines are at disequilibrium prices that arc much too high. If the disequilibrium is not 
corrected quickly the market in question might equilibrate at a fixed price too low to stimulate the 
use of the marginal capacity which is actually needed to accommodate equilibrium traffic flows. 
The problem of inappropriate equilibration can also be a result of behavioral phenomena. 
If prices are so high that no demand is expressed, a seller might not bother to offer a supply. Since 
D = S = 0, the market can accidentally equilibrate at a price that is too high. 
After the technical details of the process were worked out, several experiments were 
conducted. Figures 4-A through 4-H report the results in one conducted on September 2. The 
labeling of markets as represented in Figure 3 is changed for the purpose of the experiments. The 
markets labeled 1, 2, 3 and 4 are the three points labeled clockwise starting from the top. The 
pipelines were labeled Markets 5 through 8 in clockwise fashion beginning with the top. Each page 
is a different market. 
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As can be seen in the figures, none of the markets equilibrated. Prices in the commodity 
markets I, 2, 3, 4 tended to stabilize, but the expressed demands and supplies never equate. This is 
also true of Transportation Market 8. Transportation Market 7 is not used. Markets 5 and 6 show 
variability in all quantities. After twenty-seven iterations, the experiment was terminated. 
After an additional attempt failed to foster convergence, a different approach was taken. 
The pipeline has a knife-edged equilibrium. If prices arc exactly at equilibrium everything 
balances. However, a small deviation from equilibrium in the transportation market can cause a 
large increase in demand for pipeline transport. If the fee for transmission exactly equals the 
difference in commodity prices at the ends of the pipeline everything is in balance. If the 
difference in commodity prices is slightly above the transport fee then arbitrage profits are possible. 
Many agents attempting to capture those profits can create a large excess demand expressed for 
pipeline services. 
The new approach permitted pipeline prices on a link to be the difference between the two 
commodity prices at the two ends of the link. This convention eliminated the need for prices in the 
pipeline markets to adjust independently. Instead, they are derived from commodity prices. Two 
experiments are reported under this convention. One used the secant method and the other used the 
proportional adjustment rule. 
Since pipeline prices were derived, only the five commodity prices needed to be 
detennined by the market. When the experiment was performed, the secant process operated for 
sixty iterations before the experiment was terminated without an equilibrium or allocation. The 
time paths shown in Figure 5 reveal stable prices (but not excess demands) in three markets and 
rather unresponsive prices for a long period in Market 4. This latter phenomenon is due to a small 
change in price about Period 8 being followed by a long string of constant excess demands. Recall, 
if excess demand remains constant, so docs t:.P. About Period 50, Market 4 begins to move 
around, but then the other markets arc not moving. No signs of convergence are evident 
18 
The proportional rule was implemented in the same framework because the secant method 
did not seem to. be sufficiently responsive. The results from the proportional adjustment rule are in 
Figure 6. Notice the wide swings of excess demand in Markets 2 and 4. By Period 50, no signs of 
convergence were apparent and the experiment was tenninated. 
Analysis after these two experiments yields no good theory about what might be wrong 
with the tatonnement processes. In part, the problem could be related to the fact that expressed 
demands and supplies need not be binding. In addition, attempts by agents to get the process to 
stop, similar to the behavior observed in the one market case, can be a source of problems in 
multiple markets. Concessions can be made by agents to get one market to equilibrate, but given 
the nature of the process, there is no need to be bound by the concessions when the prices approach 
equilibrium in other markets. This process creates inconsistencies in the data used by the process 
which may be hard to overcome. Without a good theory of the problem, analysis of the processes 
was dropped. 
SECTION 4: AUTOMATED USER SELECTION MECHANISM (AUSM) 
This process involved a computer assisted market for "packages" of commodity and 
transportation. Anyone can tender a bid to supply some resources and consume others. The bid can 
be positive or negative. The bid designates the amount desired of each commodity and each 
transportation link. A negative quantity indicates a supply. 
The computer searches all bids to maximize total supplies of the system. It accepts the 
combination of bids that have the maximizing property. Agents who are not in the solution have 
the option of changing their bid and the computer tries to fit the new bid perhaps by bumping a 
previously (tentatively) accepted bid. The "bumped" agent can resubmit The process continues 
until bidding stops. 
One experiment was conducted. In this experiment no feasible solution was ever 
generated. Buyers bid too low and sellers asked too much. No feasible solution was attained so the 
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process never got started even after 100 bids had been submitted. The research on this process was 
stopped until a better theory could be found. 
SECTION 5: MULTIPLE DECENTRALIZED MARKETS 
This phase of research explored a policy of multiple decentralized markets. Prices at every 
point are detennined by the decisions of contracting parties unsupervised and unconstrained by 
administrative controls. No price limitations; ceilings and noors are improved. Prices do not result 
from an assessment of the market by an administrative source and a resulting decision about what 
an appropriate price might be, as was the case with tfitonnement processes. Instead, prices emerge 
from the hundreds of decisions made by contracting parties. 
The policy as implemented in the experiment provided a specific fonn of organization 
within which negotiation and price detennination take place. Technically, the tenn is a Multiple 
Unit Double Auction. This type of market process has been computerized so all bids/asks can be 
entered into personal computers that have been networked to facilitate interactions from remote 
locations. The computer publicly displays all bids/asks and contracts and performs the appropriate 
accounting and scheduling. 
Several experiments were conducted within the small network; the results of which are not 
reviewed here. The results reported here are only those conducted in the larger more complicated 
network. Given the nature of the issues, the larger network provides a better source of data. 
A total of nineteen markets were opened in each experiment. A separate market was 
organized for each of the nine location points. Prices quoted in Market i were for commodity for 
delivery at Point i. The commodity might have been produced at the point or it might have been 
transported there for sale. For example, prices quoted at Points 1 and 4 are ordinarily for 
commodity acquired at the producing field since those are the locations of fields, while commodity 
purchased and sold at Point F must have been transported there from some other location. 
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Similarly, a separate market was opened for each of the ten lines. Market 10, for example, 
contained price quotations for pipeline transportation from Pl to P2. In order to move commodity 
from one point in the network to another, pipeline services must be purchased separately for every 
line on the route connecting the two points. Purchase of the transportation services of pipelines 
involved a transaction in each of the separate markets over which transportation is desired. 
Each market was an open market in the sense that anyone could tender a bid for the 
commodity or transport. A bid consisted of a per unit price and a total volume desired. Similarly, 
anyone with commodity or transportation capacity to sell could tender an ask which consisted of a 
price per unit and a volume offered for sale at that price per unit. The lowest bid and ask were 
displayed to the market on individual personalized computer screens.7 If a better bid (higher unit 
price) or better ask Oower unit price) was tendered, it replaced the existing bid or ask on the screen. 
Any agent was free to accept the displayed bid or ask or accept any part of it. This was 
done by simply entering the acceptance through his/her personal computer. The computer then 
executed the contract and sent the proper accounting messages throughout the network. 
Each remote computer maintained the accounting and inventory for that person. The 
computer also displayed the bids and asks in all markets as well as the history of transactions in all 
markets. 
Agents were free to buy and resell at the same location or any other location or any other 
combination of purchases and sales among locations. Producers could purchase transportation and 
ship product to a remote location for sale. Consumers could buy commodity at a remote location, 
acquire the transportation, and then ship the commodity to their home location for their own use or 
for resale to another consumer. Pipelines could buy in one location and sell in another, using their 
own pipeline exclusively or in combination with some other pipeline whose services had been 
purchased. In other words, agents were free to buy and sell in any way that they thought was in 
7) In these markets, only the lowest bid or ask was accepted by the computer. No "book" or ''limit order" was possible. 
Such features can easily be added. 
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their own interest. 
Series 1. The Competitive Pipeline 
A glance at the network in Figure 2 reveals that two pipelines connect each point. This 
could be interpreted as two sellers who have capacity rights over the same physical pipeline. 
Alternatively, it could be interpreted as two different routes between the points which are 
equivalent from an economic perspective. Or it could be interpreted as drawn in Figure 2-as two 
separate and competing lines connecting the points. 
Notice also that no one pipeline company competes with the same competitor over all 
segments. No two companies are "side-by-side" everywhere and the ownership of pipelines, 
consumers, and producers is all separated. 
Prices 
The results of six different experiments arc contained in Figures 7-A through 7-E, along 
with the accompanying tables. All markets were open simultaneously for a series of periods after 
an initial orientation and practice period. Each period lasted for about fifteen minutes. Shown in 
the figures are the average prices for each period in each market. These are shown in relationship to 
the equilibrium prices of the competitive model. Notice that in some periods in some markets no 
transactions occur. This simply means that the producer or consumer at that location sold or 
purchased commodity at a remote location and moved the commodity himself. 
The first three experiments (January 21, January 27, and February 3) involved agents with 
no experience at all. The next three experiments (February 8, February 10, and February 18) were 
almost all experienced from the earlier three and from experiments with the smaller network. 
Notice first that the commodity prices tend to closely approximate the competitive 
equilibrium prices. Transportation prices show some variability but the averages can be misleading 
because oflow volumes. The transporters could be moving the commodity themselves and not 
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22 
selling the transportation on the open markets. The fact that the commodity is moving and that 
commodity prices are near the predicted equilibrium indicates that the transportation markets are 
working well despite what averages might indicate. 
Perhaps the most interesting arc the last two experiments in the series. These involved 
agents with the most experience. As c~n be seen, commodity prices and transportation prices 
closely approximate the competitive equilibrium. 
Efficiencies 
The efficiencies are in the Table 4. First notice that efficiencies can be negative. This can 
happen if commodity is produced and moved but not sold or used. In addition, transportation can 
be purchased but not used. Because of these features, the technical possibility exists that the 
system behaves very badly. 
In fact, as can be seen, the system improves with use. Efficiencies tend to go up as a given 
set of agents gain expertise with the process. In all experiments, the efficiency of the last three 
periods is greater than the efficiency of the Orst three periods. Similarly, the efficiency of the last 
three experiments, those that had many already experienced agents, were greater than the first three. 
In fact, in experiments 2/10 and 2/18, efficiency increased to the high 80s and low 90s. 
Series 2. Monopolized Pipelines 
For purposes of studying the effect of monopoly, competitors in all links were merged. 
The resulting network is in Figure 8. The ownership and costs for the pipelines are in Table 5. The 
economic parameters are all the same. The location and demands of consumers are the same as in 
the previously studied Figure 2 and Table 2. The location and cost of producers are the same as 
before. The total capacity and cost of each link of the pipeline is the same as before. It is as 
though the previous two pipelines on a link arc controlled by the same owner.8 The markets are 
8) In fact, two agents that formally competed now get together and share profits. They are organized so that the pair makes 
single decisions. 
TABLE 4: Efficiency of Decentralized Markets in Competitive Network 
Period 1-21 1-27 2-3 2-8 2-10 2-18 
1 .61 .53 .44 -.59 .55 .50 
2 .33 .73 .59 .44 .89 .77 
3 .76 .77 .51 .64 .85 .83 
4 .64 .83 .55 .72 .41 .82 
5 .72 .78 .48 .54 .80 .71 
6 .76 .80 .66 .88 .76 .85 
7 1.00 .84 .70 1.00 .91 .75 
8 .81 .56 .81 .82 .90 
9 .80 .85 .92 
10 .81 .90 
TABLE 5: Pipeline Ownership in Monopolized Transportation Network 
LIO M pipeline 10,16 
15,6 
Ll 1 M pipeline 5,12 
8,6 
LI2 M pipeline 6,6 
11,24 
LI3 N pipeline 14,14 
20,6 
LI4 N pipeline 29,8 
36,6 
LIS N pipeline 11,8 
16,6 
L17 p pipeline 19,14 
27,6 
L18 p piµcline 4,14 
8,6 
L19 p pipeline 5,8 
9,6 
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23 
organized exactly as before. 
Two experiments were conducted. Agents were experienced from the earlier competitive 
pipeline experiments discussed in the section above. Consequently, the initial learning about the 
technology of the market was minimized. The franc values of the redemption values were changed 
(a constant of twenty francs was added to all redemption values and all gas production cost, but not 
pipeline cost) so the expectations built from previous experiments would not have a major 
influence. Participants did not know that the underlying economic parameters were exactly as 
before. 
Results 
The series of prices are shown in Figures 9-A and 9-B. The price scale on the 
transportation graphs is different from the corresponding figures in the competitive case, so direct 
visual comparison with the competitive figures might be misleading. 
Notice first that commodity prices are near the competitive equilibrium. Transportation 
prices are substantially above the competitive equilibrium. 
Efficiencies are in Table 6. As was the case in the competitive networks, efficiencies begin 
low and increase as experience is gained and prices converge to predictable patterns. For the most 
part, the efficiencies attained are in the 70s. 
Not shown in the graph is the degree LO which the inefficiency occurred as a result of 
withheld capacity by the monopolists. It is possible that transportation prices are high, but, 
nevertheless, the commodity can be efficiently moved; all of the capacity is used by the pipeline 
itself. Inefficiencies in this case would result from attempts to transport by outsiders who purchase 
transport on some links, get frozen out by high prices on others, and,· as a result, waste the capacity 
and sometimes the product. At this time, the analysis to isolate the sources of inefficiency has not 
been perfonned. 
TABLE 6: Monopolized Network Efficiencies 
Period 3-4 #1 3-4 #2 
1 .66 -.01 
2 .31 .25 
3 .71 .32 
4 .39 .67 
5 .69 .86 
6 .75 .75 
7 .72 .80 
8 .79 .64 
9 .85 .69 
10 .65 
11 .76 
FIGURE: 9-A 
Mean Price by Period for All Markets(Mar. 3, 1988 #1) 
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Comparison of Monopoly and Competition 
The effects of competition can be most easily seen in two measures: efficiency and relative 
profits. The results on efficiency are easy to sec. The test comparison is after time is allowed for 
market adjustments in the later periods. In the later periods of competitive markets, the efficiencies 
are in the high 80s. In the later period~ of monopoly, the efficiencies are in the high 60s and low 
70s. 
The differential in efficiencies is due in part to the interdependent nature of the network. 
High, monopolized prices on one leg of a market prevent the downstream benefits of possibly 
increased commodity now. The effects of a "botllencck" in one segment have impacts elsewhere. 
The second measure of profits is presented in Table 7. Computed there are the average 
profits in the final periods of the final two competitive pipeline experiments and the two 
monopolized pipeline experiments. The profits of consumers, producers, and transporters are 
reported as groups. The profits predicted by the competitive equilibrium model are also presented. 
Notice first that the actual incomes of each group under conditions of pipeline competition 
(duopoly) compare favorably with the magnitudes predicted by the competitive equilibrium model. 
In all cases, profit falls short by comparable magnitudes (.07, .13, and .08 for consumers, producers, 
and transporters, respectively). 
Under monopoly, the deviations from the competitive model are more dramatic. Consumer 
profits are .51 less than the profits predicted by the competitive model. Producer profits are .33 less 
than the predicted profits, but the average profits of transporters are .04 less than predicted by the 
competitive model. 
It is of interest to note that the effect of monopoly is to hurt consumers and producers, but it 
does not particularly benefit the pipeline owners. Profits of the pipelines remain essentially the 
same. Under monopoly, pipelines prosper more relative to consumers and producers, but relative to 
profits when competition exists over the pipeline, the pipeline profit position is about the same. 
TABLE 7: Total Profit Per Period in Final Periods of Selected Experiments 
Competitive EQ Model 
Actual Competitive Pipelines 
Actual Monopoly Pipeline 
Consumers 
1246 
1154 
607 
Producers 
1510 
1313 
1009 
Transporters 
1118 
1032 
1064 
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The reason for this paradox is that the efficiency falls under monopoly. The fall is damaging to the 
whole industry. The total efficiency of the pipeline falls under monopoly and monopoly pipelines 
simply manage to hold on to their share. 
SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW 
Several major questions can be posed of the research. These will be reviewed. 
1. Will a tatonnement process work in a complex network? 
The ideas behind the til.tonnement process can be made sufficiently precise to implement 
operationally. The process itself seems Lo work adequately in single markets. However, the 
transition of the process to multiple markets was not successful. The reasons for the failure 
are not clear. Attempts to remove some of the !1exibility and provide greater coordination of 
price changes failed to produce a workable process. Attempts to make price changes more 
flexible to market conditions also failed to produce a workable process. Time prevented a 
pursuit of other ideas about what might make this process work. 
2. How good is the generalized Automated User Selection Mechanism? 
It did not work to produce an allocation. There are reasonable conjectures about how this 
process might be made to work. They have not been pursued. 
3. How does the decentralized market process work? 
a. It is clear that decentralized markets can coordinate to move the product. 
The interdependence inherent in a pipeline network does not prevent this. 
b. The commodity moves smoothly with no evidence of instability. 
c. Under conditions of some competition (duopoly) over all lines, prices approach the 
general competitive equilibrium levels. System efficiencies are high and improve with 
operation into the high 80 or 90 percentages. The inefficiencies that remain might be 
avoided by appropriate contingent contracts which pennit plans to be developed without 
contracts being finn. 
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d. When there is no competition in the net work, Lhe influence of monopoly can be detected. 
Efficiencies fall and !.he impact of lhe reduced efficiency falls on consumers and 
producers. 
4. How do the policies deal wir.h uncertainties and the distinction between interruptible and finn? 
These experiments were not designed to deal with that problem. The theory that was 
successful in predicting the system behavior in the decentralized markets suggests that the 
uncertainty can be incorporated without problems. The experiments have not been conducted. 
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